TNAG-1446-FCO40-1930-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 68

SECRET

get them to look

therefore show the Chinese that the issue need not be as difficult

as they feared: we should

possible mechanisms

for direct elections, which would show them that it was possible to

conduct such elections without threatening stability. His aim would

be to try to put the Chinese in the frame of mind to ask us for the

details, rather than

to

force a paper on them. The Secretary of

State said this was the are a where he felt most apprehension. He

was not sure that we had yet brought the Chinese to the point where

they would be receptive to an approach of this kind. They had

accepted that direct elections must be one of the alternatives

canvassed in Our Green Paper, but it would be dangerous to give them

the impression that we had already decided that there should

be

direct elections. He was concerned that if the Governor used the

assume that

we had already jumped this fence and would bridle. We had to find

some subtle way of getting the message across to the Chinese that

speaking notes as currently drafted,

direct elections

the Chinese would

need not

we had made Our minds up already. The Governor suggested that the

point could be made in the context o £ 1997: there was already a

clear consensus for direct elections then, and the Chinese would

have to focus on mechanisms. The Secretary of State said that in

his view it would be a mistake to suggest to the Chinese now that

direct elections were inevitable in 1997. In further discussion

be a disaster without letting them think

Mr Galsworthy wondered

clear a

consensus

if the best time to approach the Chinese

about this might not be when the outcome of the 1987 Review was

emerging: if

in

favour of direct elections seemed

to be emerging the Chinese might be readier to

to consider mechanisms.

The Governor said this would be SO if there

were a clear consensus.

But, if direct elections were supported by a substantial minority

and in the HKG's view this minority ought to be accommodated by the

introduction of direct elections for a minority of LegCo seats, it

might be very difficult at that stage to persuade the Chinese of the

rightness of this course if the ground had not been prepared with

them beforehand. There was also the point that HMG and HKG must not

be seen to have decided on a particular course of action simply

If the Review were inconclusive, and

because of Chinese

pressure.

the Chinese made statements against direct elections, it would be

very difficult to avoid this. The interpretation of the Review

would be

very

difficult.

HKG were

preparing

SECRET

a

on paper

this.