TNAG-1443-FCO40-1927-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 69

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If institutions

an appropriate

structure such

instability, and accentuate an erosion of the Governor's authority which is in any event likely to prove inevitable.

and the community could direct themselves alternative locus of authority within the Government the Government

destabilising and divisive effects could be lessened.

The retention of influence

to

7.

An

important objective for us in this connection will be to

Kong Kong before 1997, and to

the SAR after 1997. We can

retain the maximum influence in Hong project our influence into the life of

best do this if we can manage to play a role in establishing the office of Chief Executive, identifying its first incumbent and

establishing the means of his selection. We need to define what we want for Hong Kong in this connection and how it might be achieved.

The options

8. Against this background there are, in general terms, two possible approaches to the question of the Chief Executive:

Option (A). To allow the powers and the role of the Governor to

remain as they are now until 30 June 1997, when a Chief

Executive would assume office.

Option (B). To create before 1997 a post which would in effect that of Chief Executive (Designate) and gradually to delegate or devolve powers to him.

Option (A)

9. Option (A) is consistent with present Chinese thinking, the dangers of which are described in para 6 above. Although we would be fulfilling the letter of the Joint Declaration by maintaining direct responsibility for the administration of Hong Kong until 1997, in practice our authority would be weakened by the existence of a Chinese-appointed Chief Executive waiting in the wings. His choice would be entirely a a matter for the PRC. We would have no means of influencing the establishment or the filling of his post.

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