TNAG-1443-FCO40-1927-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 44

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Option (B) A post which would in effect (although not in name) be that of Chief Executive (Designate) would be created

before 1997. This would be done in two stages. Firstly the

post of Deputy Governor would be created within the Hong Kong Government: subsequently, nearer 1997, it would be filled by the person who would hold office as Chief Executive (Designate) before and after 1997. The powers which will be exercised by the Chief Executive after 1997 would be gradually delegated or devolved to the occupant of the post from the Governor, starting at a point in time before 1997. The Governor would retain ultimate authority and specific responsibility, under the direction of HMG, for security, defence and foreign affairs.

be

7. Option (A) has the advantage that HMG would be seen maintaining direct and unequivocal responsibility for the governing

This would be the clearest way of of Hong Kong until 1997. upholding the commitment to this effect in the Joint Declaration (although it can also be effectively upheld under option (B)).

8.

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The disadvantage of option (A) is that the handover in 1997 would be abrupt, and militate against) a smooth transition. Chief Executive (even if chosen beforehand) would have no experience of high authority and responsibility when he assumed all his functions on 1 July 1997.

9.

It is only realistic to recognise that as we move closer to 1997 the people of Hong Kong, the legislature, and other representative institutions will be in increasingly close contact with the Chinese. They will increasingly look to the Chinese for approval, if not instructions, in their approach to public business. At present the Chinese appear to envisage that the Chief Executive would be chosen before 1997 but would assume a role in the administration only on 1 July 1997. The existence of a Chief Executive designated by China but not formally integrated into the Government structure would be an awkward and potentially dangerous alternative focus of political power. This could cause political instability, and accentuate in the years running up to 1997 an erosion of the Governor's authority which is likely to prove inevitable. If institutions and the

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