TNAG-1443-FCO40-1927-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 162

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someone

to

take а lead in presenting government policies

Legislative Council and more generally in the public area. Governor will not be able to perform this role.

14.

in

the

The

We

In principle the advantages of option (B) are clear-cut. need however to consider carefully the implications for our relationship with China and our objective of securing the maximum

influence over developments in Hong Kong.

The Chinese Dimension

government"

be

on which

15. The introduction of a Chief Executive (Designate) before 1997

could be

be achieved successfully only

successfully only in agreement with

agreement with the Chinese

Government. This would be not an abdication of responsibility but a

practical necessity. Such modifications to the Hong Kong Government

structure would without doubt

"matters relating to

to the smooth

transfer of

the two sides are bound by the

terms of the Joint Declaration to consult. We would need to explain to the Chinese how we envisaged that the post would fit within the Hong Kong Government structure, how the incumbent would be selected

and how

would be progressively delegated to him. powers

If we

sought to

ahead go

without consultation with the Chinese the objective of a smooth transition, brought about in cooperation with China, could not be achieved.

16.

Such consultation, if it led to agreement and to the

appointment of an individual who would bridge the

of change

sovereignty in 1997, would offer us a valuable means of acquiring enhanced influence over events after 1997, because the first Chief

Executive would be a candidate acceptable to ourselves as well as to the Chinese Government. It is true that as a quid pro quo we would

have conceded to the Chinese

over an appointment made

influence

before 1997. But the bargain would be in our favour. We would retain full responsibility for the administration of Hong Kong up to 30 June 1997, as the Joint Declaration provides. We would retain control over the process by which the candidate was appointed, both in the early 1990s and nearer 1997. This formal power would give us the means of resisting any attempt by the Chinese to impose on Hong Kong before 1997 a Chief Executive (Designate) who would not be

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