TNAG-1443-FCO40-1927-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 150

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THE RETENTION OF INFLUENCE

7.

AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE FOR US IN THIS CONNECTION WILL BE

TO RETAIN THE MAXIMUM INFLUENCE IN HONG KONG BEFORE 1997, AND TO

PROJECT OUR INFLUENCE INTO THE LIFE OF THE SAR AFTER 1997. WE

CAN BEST DO THIS IF WE CAN MANAGE TO PLAY A ROLE IN ESTABLISHING

THE OFFICE OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE, IDENTIFYING ITS FIRST INCUMBENT

AND ESTABLISHING THE MEANS OF HIS SELECTION. WE NEED TO DEFINE

WHAT WE WANT FOR HONG KONG IN THIS CONNECTION AND HOW IT MIGHT BE

ACHIEVED.

THE OPTIONS

8.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THERE ARE, IN GENERAL TERMS, TWO

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE:

OPTION (A). TO ALLOW THE POWERS AND THE ROLE OF THE

GOVERNOR TO REMAIN AS THEY ARE NOW UNTIL 30 JUNE 1997,

WHEN A CHIEF EXECUTIVE WOULD ASSUME OFFICE.

OPTION (B). TO CREATE BEFORE 1997 A POST WHICH WOULD IN

EFFECT THAT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE (DESIGNATE) AND GRADUALLY

TO DELEGATE OR DEVOLVE POWERS TO HIM.

OPTION (A)

9.

OPTION (A) IS CONSISTENT WITH PRESENT CHINESE THINKING,

THE DANGERS OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED IN PARA 6 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH WE

WOULD BE FULFILLING THE LETTER OF THE JOINT DECLARATION BY

MAINTAINING DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF HONG

KONG UNTIL 1997, IN PRACTICE OUR AUTHORITY WOULD BE WEAKENED BY

THE EXISTENCE OF A CHINESE-APPOINTED CHIEF EXECUTIVE WAITING IN

THE WINGS. HIS CHOICE WOULD BE ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR THE PRC.

WE WOULD HAVE NO MEANS OF INFLUENCING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR THE

FILLING OF HIS POST.

10.

SUCH AN ABRUPT BREAK IN 1997 WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH RISK

FOR HONG KONG. IT WOULD BE THE OPPOSITE OF THE SMOOTH TRANSITION

WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED TO ACHIEVE. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WOULD

HAVE NO EXPERIENCE OF HIGH AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY WHEN HE

ASSUMED ALL HIS FUNCTIONS ON 1 JULY 1997. NOR WOULD THE

LEGISLATURE OR THE CIVIL SERVICE BE ACCUSTOMED TO WORKING WITH

THE POST OR THE INDIVIDUAL.

OPTION (B)

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