TNAG-1443-FCO40-1927-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 143

SECRET

72502

-

DAY-TO-DAY INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE IN THE HANDS OF THE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT. AFTER 30 JUNE 1997 SOME OF THE GOVERNOR'S

POWERS (EG IN THE AREAS OF DEFENCE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS) WOULD

PASS TO THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT: OTHERS (EG THE POWERS OF

DISALLOWANCE AND THE POWER TO OVERRIDE THE ACTIONS OF THE CHIEF

EXECUTIVE ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF HMG) WOULD END.

D.

9.

METHOD OF SELECTION

THE PRESENT CHINESE POSITION IS THAT THE FIRST CHIEF

EXECUTIVE SHOULD BE CHOSEN BEFORE 1997 BY CONSULTATION, WHATEVER

THE METHOD TO BE USED SUBSEQUENTLY. THE CHINESE DO NOT YET SEEM

TO HAVE CONSIDERED WHO SHOULD BE CONSULTED OR HOW THE

CONSULTATION EXERCISE SHOULD BE MOUNTED.

10.

AT PRESENT THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT

AGREE TO THE SELECTION OF THE FIRST CHIEF EXECUTIVE BY ELECTION.

(A MAJOR FACTOR IN THEIR THINKING MUST BE THAT IN PRACTICE AN

ELECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN HONG KONG WHILE THE

TERRITORY WAS STILL UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.) THERE WOULD

HOWEVER BE GREAT ADVANTAGE, IN TERMS OF CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG,

IF THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE METHOD OF SELECTION TO BE USED AFTER

1997 COULD BE TESTED OUT IN ADVANCE, FOR THE SELECTION OF THE

FIRST CHIEF EXECUTIVE. THIS WOULD ASSIST HIM BY ENSURING THAT HE

ENTERED OFFICE WITH A DEMONSTRABLE DEGREE OF SUPPORT FROM THE

PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. WE SHOULD PUT THESE ARGUMENTS TO THE

CHINESE IN DUE COURSE.

E.

CANDIDATES

11.

IT IS TOO EARLY TO CONSIDER WHAT TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL MIGHT

BE BEST SUITED TO BE THE FIRST CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG KONG

SAR.

BROADLY SPEAKING THE CHOICE IS BETWEEN A FORMER OFFICIAL

DRAWN FROM THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AND A NON-OFFICIAL

WITH A BACKGROUND IN THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND/OR THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. THE FORMER WOULD BRING MORE DIRECT EXPERIENCE OF

PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATION, THE LATTER A HIGHER POLITICAL PROFILE.

IF WE ENVISAGED TWO TERMS OF OFFICE FOR A DEPUTY GOVERNOR BEFORE

1997, THE TWO INCUMBENTS NEED NOT BE DRAWN FROM THE SAME

BACKGROUND. WE HAVE NO CLEAR PICTURE OF THINKING IN PEKING ON

THIS POINT, BEYOND ONE OR TWO INDICATIONS (NOT NECESSARILY

4

SECRET

1