TNAG-1441-FCO40-1925-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1987 — Page 173

(B)

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TELNO 324 OF 1985, SUB-PARAS 3 (III) AND (IV) STILL SEEM

RELEVANT.

PRESS REPORTS ARE UNCLEAR ON WHETHER LI WAS RULING OUT

ANY POWER FOR THE LEGISLATURE TO 'DISMISS' THE CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OR TO 'PASS A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE' IN HIM.

WE FEEL THE FORMER WOULD IN ANY EVENT NOT BE ATTAINABLE :

IF THE CPG ARE TO APPOINT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE THEY WILL

SURELY WISH TO RETAIN THE RIGHT TO DISMISS HIM. ON THE

OTHER HAND IT WOULD SEEM HELPFUL IF THERE WAS PROVISION

FOR THE LEGISLATURE TO PASS A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE AND

IN EFFECT TO INVITE THE CPG TO REMOVE THE CHIEF

EXECUTIVE. TO RESTRICT THIS RIGHT TO IMPEACHMENT,

PRESUMABLY FOR A CRIMINAL OFFENCE (PARA 2(D)(IV)) WOULD

SEEM TO LIMIT THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATURE TOO MUCH.

5.

WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS. IT WOULD BE

HELPFUL TO CLEAR OUR MINDS BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL

GROUP ON THE SAR'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE ON 4 JULY, AND PERHAPS TO

BRIEF TRUSTY HONG KONG PARTICIPANTS ACCORDINGLY.

HOWE

HONG KONG AGREEMENT : RESTRICTED

LIMITED

HD/HKD

HD/FED

RESEARCH D (FE)

DEP/HD PUSD

COPIES TO:

MR FIFOOT, LEGAL ADVISERS

PS/MR RENTON

MR WILSON

SIR.

W. HARDING

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