AND BEYOND 1997:
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(B)
TO DESCRIBE TO THEM THE PRESENT FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT
IN HONG KONG, EMPHASISING THE HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY ENJOYED IN PRACTICE BY HONG KONG AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
LOCAL CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS:
(C)
(D)
(E)
TACTICS
TO EXPLAIN THE ISSUES LIKELY TO APISE IN THE 1987 REVIEW
(INCLUDING DIRECT ELECTIONS) DRAWING ATTENTION BOTH TO
THE NEED FOR PESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC CONCERNS AND TO OUR
DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH CAUTION. IN PARTICULAR WE
MUST ALLAY CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT OUR MOTIVES IN
CONDUCTING THE PEVIEW AND ITS LIKELY OUTCOME:
TO IDENTIFY AND DISCUSS THE APEAS WHERE EVOLUTION WILL BE
NECESSARY IF CONVERGENCE IS TO BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN PLACE BEFORE 1997 AND THAT OF THE
HONG KONG SAP AFTER 1997:
BY THIS MEANS TO DRAW OUT THE CHINESE ON THEIR INTENTIONS
IN DRAFTING THE BASIC LAW, AND TO INFLUENCE THE DRAFTING
PROCESS IN THE INTEREST OF EN SUPING CONVERGENCE ON A
BASIS SATISFACTORY TO HMG AND HONG KONG.
4.
THE CONVERSATION WITH WU WILL BE ESSENTIALLY A WORKING MEAL, PELATIVELY SHOFT (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INTERPRETATION) AND PELATIVELY UNSTRUCTURED. IT WILL BE ABLE TO DO NO MORE THAN LAY
THE FOUNDATION FOR MORE DETAILED EXCHANGES IN SUBSEQUENT
MEETINGS, SOME AT A LOWER LEVEL. IT WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT TO CREATE THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE THAN TO MAKE DETAILED POINTS. BUT
THERE IS ALSO A DANGER OF SECURING NO MORE THAN THE CONTINUATION
OF A SPORADIC DIALOGUE WHICH, WHILE PERHAPS RELATIVELY AMICABLE,
PEMAINS ONE-SIDED OF LARGELY DEVOID OF SUBSTANCE. WE NEED TO PIN
THE CHINESE FIRMLY DOWN TO A MORE INTENSIVE AND DETAILED TWO-WAY
EXCHANGE.
5.
WE SUGGEST THAT THE CONVERSATION MIGHT BE STEEPED TO
COVER THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
(A)
(B)
(BRIEFLY) PROGRESS OVER THE PAST YEAR IN IMPLEMENTING THE
JOINT DECLARATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE WORK OF THE JLG:
THE PROBLEM OF CONVERGENCE. THE POINTS OF DEPARTURE WILL
2
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