TNAG-1439-FCO40-1923-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1986 — Page 178

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Agenda:

Memoranda XCX(86)45 and XCX(86)46, specifically:

(a) the Chief Executive's introduction prior

to 1997;

(b)

(c)

composition of LegCo following the 1987 Review;

means of influencing the content of the Basic Law.

The Chief Executive/Governor

2.

The Governor made the following points:

(a) for their different reasons, HMG, Hong Kong people and the CPG would all want a British Governor, appointed by London, remain until 1997;

to

(b) the only way of governing Hong Kong, before and after 1997, was by consent. The alternative

imposition of the Government's will by force inconceivable.

The prime objective, therefore, was to avoid a situation where there was any risk of the latter occurring;

was

(c) HMG would need to retain some emergency powers. Some powers could be delegated to a local Chief Executive, but HMG would always have the right to recover these if necessary;

(d)

while it would be open to Peking to appoint their Own man to replace the ? British Governor in 1997 this was not a foregone conclusion. While Hong Kong was geographically distant from London, it was close to Peking and even closer to Guangdong province. For example, it would be easy for the CPG to keep their troops over the border and still retain their responsibility for external defence but impossible for London to maintain its responsibilities

here without a garrison in Hong Kong.

While it was therefore necessary for a British Governor to remain in Hong Kong until 1997 to exercise HMG's residual responsibilities,

responsibilities, the same could not be said for Peking after 1997;

G.F. 316

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