Weng Kong, Reduction of
Garrison.
Previous Reference: CC. (53) 54th Conclusions, Minute 1.)
3
NIE MAJATY
15 April 1954,
C.C. 29 (54)
1. The Foreign Secretary drew attention to the decision taken by the Defence Committee, at their meeting on the previous day, that after the end of the Geneva Conference the Hong Kong garrison should be reduced by gradual and unobtrusive stages to the level required for internal security purposes. If this decision became known to the United States authorities, it would prejudice the pros- pects of establishing a system of collective defence in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific. And if the Chinese got to know of it, negotiation at Geneva would be made even more difficult. He hoped, therefore, that nothing would be said to indicate to the Governor of Hong Kong, or to the military commanders in the Far East, that a decision had already been taken to reduce the garrison after the Geneva Conference.
The Prime Minister agreed that the decision taken by the Defence Committee must be kept most secret. For the time being the Governor of Hong Kong should be told that no action was being taken on the proposal to reduce the garrison and that the matter would be reviewed after the Geneva Conference. In the meantime, no hint of any kind should be given that a reduction of the garrison was contemplated.
The Cabinet-
Invited the Colonial Secretary to inform the Governor of Hong Kong that no immediate action would be taken to reduce the garrison, that the matter would be reviewed after the Geneva Conference, and that in the meantime no hint should be given that any reduction was contemplated.
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Egypt.
(Previous Reference:
C.C. (54) 21st Conclusions, Minute 2.) Protection of the British Community.
2. The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Chiefs of Staff (D. (54) 19) and the Foreign Secretary (C. (54) 148) on the military arrangements for safeguarding British civilians in Egypt in an emergency.
The Foreign Secretary said that the Chiefs of Staff were now suggesting that we should be content with plans for (i) sending a strong flying column to bring out from Cairo such British subjects as could assemble within the Embassy precincts in an emergency, and (ii) sending warships into Alexandria. He could not think that these plans were adequate. Provisions ought also to be made for a more powerful follow-up operation, which would preserve British and foreign lives and property in Cairo and Alexandria by restoring order in these cities. If a situation arose which called for intervention by us, we might have an opportunity to set up an alternative Govern- ment and we should be ill-advised to miss such an opportunity. The Egyptians already knew that we had plans for occupying the Delta, and this knowledge was a powerful guarantee of their good behaviour. If we now restricted our plans in the way proposed by the Chiefs of Staff, we should be abandoning this useful negotiating card. He felt that, so long as we retained forces in the Canal Zone, we ought to be ready to intervene effectively in the Delta if the situation demanded it.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the object of the modified plan was to enable a start to be made with the re- deployment of the fighting troops in the Canal Zone. So long as we accepted a firm commitment to occupy the Delta in an emergency, no reduction could be made in the garrison of the Canal Zone. More- over, if we had to restore order in Cairo and Alexandria and support an alternative Government, it was likely that reinforcements would be needed from the United Kingdom.
In discussion the following points were made:-
(a) It was impossible to forecast the scope and nature of the operations which might be required if we had to intervene in the Delta.
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