TNAG-1427-FCO40-1910-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1986 — Page 187

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"humane deterrence" nor the continued risks of the high seas have stemmed the large migratory flow. The migration will likely continue if new initiatives are not taken to cope with it.

generous international humanitarian effort to resettle refugees.

We will also likely see the door closed to those bona fide refugees who may come out in the future. If we do not separate refugees from those in the growing migratory stream, we can expect to see a backlash against the entire program and the generous resettlement offers could come to an end.

And the issue of equity will also grow. Today, hundreds of thousands of legal immigrants applying to come to the United States are standing patiently in line around the world, most waiting to join their U.S. citizen relatives in the United States. They will understandably ask why brothers and sisters-much less cousins, aunts and uncles-from Vietnam and Laos can enter the United States to join their families after only a few months, while the brothers and sisters of Philippino- American or Mexican-American citizens must wait up to five to nine years. This is acceptable if they are refugees. If they are migrants, it is another matter. And that is the growing issue today in the Indochinese refugee program.

We must act urgently to separate and cope differently with the refugee and non-refugee components of the on-going migratory flow from Indochina. If we are to end the drift in our current course, the United States must give renewed priority to the recommendations in a 1981 report to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immi- gration and Refugee Policy:

a) maintenance of adequate humanitarian assistance to meet the relief and rehabilitation needs of refugees, displaced persons, and others in need in Southeast Asia; b) protection of bona fide refugees, and provision for their resettlement in third countries;

c) safe and secure repatriation, under UNHCR (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) aus- pices, for those who can return to their native countries;

d) local settlement for those whose best interest is served by remaining where they are, with appropriate assistance from the UNHCR and donor countries;

e) full implementation of orderly departure programs for those who seek to leave the countries of Indochina, especially family reunion cases from Vietnam;

f) support for renewed diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict that is the source of much refugee movement, especially from Cambodia; and

g) improved relations with the countries of Indochina in order to deal directly with them in implementing

orderly departure programs and in resolving problems

! that contribute to the flow of people, perhaps including post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, if appropriate.

Economic Migration

Many of the refugees fleeing the countries of Indo- china today have strong family or other political and economic ties to the United States. There can be no question that the United States must continue a refugee resettlement program for these people for the forseeable future.

But this humanitarian task-for the United States as well as for other resettlement countries-is going to be increasingly difficult as these refugees and family reunifi- cation cases are engulfed in a migratory flow. Growing numbers of persons, particularly among Vietnamese leaving their.country in boats and Laotians crossing the Mekong River, are classic examples of economic mi- grants: persons leaving their native lands to find a better life elsewhere. Obviously, there is nothing new or wrong about such movements, but migrants do pose different problems, and they must be treated differently from refugees. Otherwise, we risk eroding the principles and protections offered to refugees.

In the context of Southeast Asia, this distinction will not be easy, given the refusal of countries of first asylum to consider local settlement or to accept migrants from neighboring countries. For a variety of historical and ethnic reasons, the arrival of Vietnamese is particularly troublesome for most countries in the region. Thailand has insisted from the outset that it will not allow any Vietnamese to remain in Thailand, given its problems since 1954 with earlier Vietnamese refugees.

But the large migratory flow will likely continue if new initiatives are not taken to cope with it. Neither "humane deterrence"-lengthy stays in austere camps-nor the continued risks of the high seas have stemmed the flow. According to a State Department survey of Vietnamese boat arrivals in Song Khla, Thailand, early last year, only "one-third gave political persecution as their personal motivation for flight from Vietnam. Fifteen percent fled to evade military service, 4 percent to reunite with family" members overseas, and 47 percent cited economic hard- ship and a desire for personal advancement as their prime motivation for flight."

In addition, this survey found that "the group exhibited a high awareness of the perils of piracy and the provisions of the Thai 'humane deterrence' policy.” Yet 47 percent risked that in hope of bettering their lives.

This is not to suggest that economic factors should be given little or no consideration in determining refugee status. Clearly, the economic factors that many Viet- namese cite are the result of systematic persecution by their government. Their economic plight may be the result of their previous political or economic status under