TNAG-1426-FCO40-1909-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 44

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its nature.

July, it is

Since we have

now thought

from

received enquiry to SCORRI

an

hither to been I ed

in Hong Kong to be

to expect a reply by

imminent. We have just

the Acting Governor about the position. Any delay in replying will cause considerable alarm and despondency.

It will also give rise to even stronger suspicions as to our

intentions. In my view a delay would be wearable only if we could

be sure of getting a satisfactory answer at the end of it. A delay

followed by an unsatisfactory answer would give us the worst of all

worlds.

4.

not

the

over

I am very

concerned about the substance of the decision. I do

think that there even a slight chance that mere acceptance of

family reunion cases, which probably now number only a little

400, will give us an effective base from which to launch the

diplomatic offensive with other countries which SCORRI want. Our acceptance of the family reunion cases has already been to a large

extent discounted in other resettlement countries. We shall be told

that we are only doing what we should have done long ago and asked

what our future intentions are. Only a continuing commitment will

make an impression. A diplomatic offensive based on SCORRI only

> would not only be ineffective, but would make it much more difficult

to bring any subsequent pressure to bear on the countries

concerned.

5. Our policy on admissions of Vietnamese to this country must also

B be seen against our refusal to con template the involuntary

repatriation of refugees to Vietnam, in spite of the strong

the strong wishes

of the Executive Council in Hong Kong. We could expect the

strongest reaction in Hong Kong: i t is a matter on which all

sections of the community feel deeply and the damage to public faith

there in our willingness to support Hong

period would be serious. I recognise that

ad amant, this is a battle we may not win.

extremely important that we should fight it, to Cabinet Committee

level if necessary.

Kong in this difficult

if the Home Secretary is

But I think that is

is

proposal that we

6. If we are unable to gain acceptance of our

should in principle take 500 a year from Hong Kong, there may be

C scope for the compromise originally proposed in my submission of 16

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