TNAG-1426-FCO40-1909-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 142

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successful and there were not many "handicapped" refugees left in

the camps.

A similar system might be instituted whereby

resettlement countries might be asked to take 100 or more

long-stayers. The problem of long-stayers was mainly in Hong Kong:

5,300 of those in Hong Kong had arrived before 1982. (Indonesia had

184 such cases, Malaysia 200, the Philippines 199, Japan had none).

Mr Galsworthy suggested that Mr Hartling might wish to explain the

problem of long-stayers to Mr Waddington.

7. Mr Luce said that we had perhaps not discriminated enough when

selecting Vietnamese refugees for resettlement in the UK: as a result 80% were unemployed. Mr Hartling disagreed: he said UNHCR

would prefer countries not to "pick" refugees, but rather to take a

cross-section.

8. Mr Luce said we were keen to step up opportunities for

education and training of refugees. He mentioned Ambassador

Douglas' suggestion that the Refugee Processing Centre at Bataan might be used for this purpose. Mr Hartling said that RPC Bataan

Much was an expensive facility and would not contribute to the welfare of refugees while they were in Hong Kong. Language and vocational training were the most important, and these were already available

in Hong Kong. Refugees in open camps had less time for language

courses because they went out to work; but UNHCR did what they could

to ensure that they had adequate opportunities.

9.

Mr Hartling said that his Deputy would be going to Australia

the following week, and Mr Feldmann would shortly be visiting

Ottawa: was there anything they could say to the Canadian and

Australian Governments? Mr Luce replied that although we would

welcome any help UNHCR could give, timing would be a problem. Until

the British Government had reached a decison on the SCORRI

recommendations it would be difficult to persuade other countries to

take action on resettlement. The crucial moment would be

immediately after the publication of our reply to SCORRI.

10. The meeting ended at 10.30 am

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