TNAG-1425-FCO40-1908-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 46

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CONFIDENTIAL

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which have been identified will be successful in containing

the problem. A full solution to the problem would require

both success in increasing the rate of departures, and in

decreasing the rate of arrivals. For the reasons given below

the latter objective for the moment is not likely to be

attainable: this makes the former objective doubly important.

Decreasing Arrivals

4. Of the options identified in the paper for stemming

the flow of further arrivals in Hong Kong, towing out to sea

is clearly unacceptable. For the reasons explained in

paragraph 19(a) of the paper, repatriation on a voluntary

basis is unlikely to have much impact on numbers; there are

virtually no volunteers.

5. I have considered carefully the arguments set out in

päras 17 and 18 of the paper on the question of opening a

dialogue with the Vietnamese on forcible repatriation of

boat people to Vietnam. I have however concluded that

Parliamentary and public opinion in this country would not

accept that we should discuss forcible repatriation with the

Vietnamese regime given our condemnation both of Vietnamese

human rights policies at home, and their policy towards

Cambodia. There is in any case virtually no prospect that

the Vietnamese would cooperate either in receiving the people

concerned or in giving assurances about their treatment.

Even if they did, they would not be believed. A policy of

forcible repatriation would be likely to be compared in this

country with the repatriation post-Yalta of Soviet prisoners

at the end of the Second World War. In short we should rouse

a storm of protest with no corresponding gain. A decision not to talk to the Vietnamese about possible repatriation will

be highly unpopular in Hong Kong. We risk being accused of

forcing the territory to shoulder burdens which we are

unwilling either to share or allow them to alleviate themselves.

CONFIDENTIAL