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be possible at all without Vietnamese cooperation, and that it would
not be possible in either political
satisfactory assurances
as to the
or humanitarian terms without
treatment of those concerned.
The other
The se are unlikely to be forthcoming.
arguments against
the course essentially stem from these two points. The only way to
make sure that we
are drawing the right conclusions, and more
important to convince the Executive Council in Hong Kong that they
are the right ones, is to talk to the
attitude.
Vietnamese about their
PM. Vienl
V
13. The arguments in favour of this are:
перемешанны
(1)
(2)
в
is known we
expines lth? explary
Ichel, akker (3)
nernam
14.
say
Although we are not optimistic of the outcome, we cannot
with absolute certainty what the Vietnamese attitude
will be or how it will evolve. We should therefore try to
initiate a dialogue with them, even if it may be years
before it produces any fruit (if it ever does).
There
is very strong pressure from the Hong Kong
Government, supported by the Executive Council (and
undoubtedly by local popular opinion) to explore the
possibility of involuntary repatriation. Even though the
probability
is that the course will turn out to be
impracticable we owe it to Hong Kong to explore
seriously and not to dismiss it out of hand.
I f
Our approach to the Vietnamese is unsuccessful,
fact alone will enable us
on to put greater pressure
countries to do more for Hong Kong in resettlement terms.
The arguments against are:
it
this
other
(1)
negative.
the approach.
wims
(2)
of
enie LINDER
-Thnow hud
into bom-
Can & will
declare can
There is a danger that even discussing
involuntary repatriation with damage our relations with the UNHCR.
nor take any mo
refugees - 18 will sed
back fuhu
~fação
A11 the evidence
is
that the
They might seek to
Vietnamese response will be
embarrass us by publicising
the possibility
the
Vietnamese
will
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