TNAG-1425-FCO40-1908-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 209

CONFIDENTIAL

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MKK 243/5

RECEIVED IN HEGGIÀY

14 MAY 1985

DESK OFFICE

INDEX

NISTRY

bution Taken

حة

Decreasing arrivals

5. We should not, for the time being, talk to the Vietnamese authorities about the possibility of involuntary repatriation. Mr Luce believes that there is no prospect of the Vietnamese authorities agreeing to co-operate with such a programme and that there would be an outcry if it became known that HMG was talking to Hanoi along these lines. He recognises that there could be tactical advantages, in our dealings with the Hong Kong Government and with the Home Office, in being seen to have tried this option; and that a rebuff from the Vietnamese could help persuade other countries that the refugees were not simply economic migrants. But he believes that the right course, for the moment, is to do all we can to bring the problem down to manageable size through increasing the resettlement of those presently in the camps.

Training

>

H.O.

may

appland Hol

герава

6. We should, as the Department recommend, explore methods of improving training facilities in the camps in order to facilitate the integration of Vietnamese refugees in the countries of their ultimate destination.

Comment

7. Mr Luce believes that action on these lines would show our determination to bring the Vietnamese refugee problem in Hong Kong under control, and would constitute a reasonable response to the SCORRI Report. He recognises that there may be criticism of the absence of an undertaking to end the closed camps, which SCORRI would like, but concludes, reluctantly, that the political difficulties inherent in even considering involuntary repatriation leave us with no choice but to allow Hong Kong to keep the camps in existence for the time being.

13

J. Wessmant

P J WESTMACOTT

PS/Mr Luce

CONFIDENTIAL