TNAG-1425-FCO40-1908-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 118

CONFIDENTIAL

(b)

Involuntary repatriation to Vietnam

16. The Hong Kong Government has proposed this on several

occasions

since 1982.

The proposals are based on the premise that the

majority of arrivals are now not true refugees, and they should

therefore be treated in the same way as persons from other countries

seeking to enter Hong Kong: new arrivals would be screened, and

those who lacked either proper documentation or convincing grounds on which to claim asylum would be treated as illegal immigrants and returned to Vietnam. Only those able to provide convincing grounds

on which to claim asylum as refugees would be granted it. This would be in keeping with Hong Kong's treatment of illegal immigrants

from China, who have been repatriated since 1974.

17. The arguments in favour of such a course are that it would be effective as a deterrent, and that even where the deterrent failed

to work it could dispose of a good part of the problem posed by

future refugee arrivals. I t would be popular in Hong Kong, and would probably allow the closed camp policy to be abandoned. It would be consistent with our policy on illegal immigration

from

China.

•

to

18. The arguments against are that the course would be likely to be very badly received by public and parliamentary opinion here, and

would encounter vociferous objection from the refugee lobby. Since

Hong Kong has no land boundary with Vietnam and aircraft or ships

would need to be used, there could be considerable physical difficulty in carrying out repatriation, and a high profile could not be avoided. Indeed it would be required if the policy were be effectively It would be difficult to secure UNHCR cooperation

with such a programme (although there are s ome conflicting views within UNHCR) and impossible unless the Vietname se Government

given credible assurances that they would not ill treat

persons

returned to Vietnam. Such assurances would also be essential from

the point of view of public and parliamentary opinion, and in order

to avoid breaching our obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Perhaps the clinching argument is that on available evidence it is unlikely to be possible to secure

either Vietnamese agreement to receive back the persons concerned,

or assurances as to their

Nor would such assurances

treatment.

had

CONFIDENTIAL

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