TNAG-1424-FCO40-1907-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 30

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(b)

Involuntary repatriation to Vietnam

therefore be

16. The Hong Kong Government has proposed this on several occasions

since 1982.

The proposals are based on the premise that the

majority of arrivals are now not true refugees, and they should

treated in the same way as persons from other countries

seeking to enter Hong Kong: new arrivals would be screened, and

those who lacked either proper documentation or convincing grounds

on which to claim asylum would be treated as illegal immigrants and

returned to Vietnam. Only those able to provide convincing grounds

on which to claim asylum as refugees would

be granted it.

would be in keeping with Hong Kong's treatment of illegal immigrants

from China, who have been repatriated since 1974.

This

17. The arguments in favour of such a course are that it would

certainly be effective as a deterrent, that even where the deterrent

failed to

to work it could dispose of a good part of the problem posed

by future refugee arrivals, and that it is justified by the

non-refugee nature of a large proportion of recent arrivals.

would be popular in Hong Kong, and would probably allow the closed camp policy to be abandoned. It would be consistent with our policy

on illegal immigration from China.

18.

It

and

to

Arguments against are that the Course would be likely to be

generally unpopular with public and parliamentary opinion here,

would encounter vociferous objection from the

the refugee lobby. Since

Hong Kong has no

land boundary with Vietnam and aircraft or ships

would need to be used, there could be considerable physical

difficulty in carrying out repatriation, and a high profile could

not be avoided. Indeed it would be required if the policy were

be effectively. It would be difficult to secure UNHCR cooperation

with such a programme (although there are some conflicting views.

within UNHCR) and impossible unless the Vietnamese Government had

given credible assurances that they would not ill treat persons

returned to Vietnam. Such assurances would also be essential from

the point of view of public and parliamentary opinion, and in order

to avoid breaching our obligations under the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights. On available evidence it

evidence it will be

very difficult to secure either Vietnamese

agreement to receive back

or assurances as to their treatment.

the

concerned, persons

The

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