TNAG-1424-FCO40-1907-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 19

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our efforts to reduce the camp population in the absence of measures

for repatriation. The only identified option which seems to merit

further exploration is involuntary repatriation to Vietnam.

Involuntary Repatriation

12. Paras 17 and 18 of the paper set out the advantages and

drawbacks of this course. The advantages are obvious: if we could

get a scheme going it would enable us substantially to dispose of

the problem. But it is also clear that there are formidable

obstacles to its being adopted. The central point is that the

course would not be possible at

be possible at all without Vietnamese cooperation

and would not be possible in political (or humanitarian terms without

The

satisfactory assurances as to the treatment of those concerned.

other arguments against the course essentially stem from these two

points. The only way to make sure that we are drawing the right

conclusions is to talk to the Vietnamese about their attitude.

13.

The arguments in favour of this are:

(1) We cannot say with certainty how the Vietnamese attitude

will evolve. We should therefore try to initiate a dialogue

with them, even if it may be years before it produces any fruit

(if it ever does).

14.

(2) There is very strong pressure from the Hong Kong

Government, supported by the Executive Council (and undoubtedly

by local popular opinion) to explore the possibility of

involuntary repatriation. We owe it to Hong Kong, even if the

course turns out to be impracticable, to explore it seriously

and not to dismiss it out of hand.

this

(3) I f our approach to the Vietnamese is unsuccessful,

fact alone will enable us to put greater pressure on other

countries to do more for Hong Kong in resettlement terms.

The arguments against are:

(1)

All the evidence is that the Vietnamese response will be

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