TNAG-1423-FCO40-1906-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 94

Х

employed?).

5.

CONFIDENTIAL

A

where they

are

defarved of their

liberty

>

...

Initially the rate of resettlement in Western countries in

response to the crisis was high; average stays in Hong Kong were

months. In 1982, however, when resettlement levels fell sharply,

Hong Kong's refugee population rose accordingly (see table ...).

The Hong Kong Government introduced the closed centre policy in July

of that year. Since that date, under a further special provision of

the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance, all newly arriving refugees

have been placed in closed centres

and are not permitted to seek

outside employment. The aim of this policy is to deter would-be

refugees from setting out from Vietnam, The Hong Kong Government

have attempted to ensure that news of the policy reaches those still

in Vietnam by enclosing a warning notice with letters sent by closed

centre inhabitants to their relatives in Vietnam. The centres are

run by the Correctional Services Department, who are also

responsible for running Hong Kong's prisons and other correctional

institutions. The UNHCR pay one third of the cost (HK$ 20 million

out of a total of HK$ 60 million in 1984).

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CLOSED CENTRE POLICY

6. Effect on arrivals figures

The policy has been partially successful in that it appears to have

helped to reduce the number of refugee arrivals: 1983 arrivals were

50% down on 1982, 1984 were 39% down on 1983, (compared with

reductions of

.% in 1983, and 17% in 1984 in the South East Asian

region as a whole). However against this success must be offset the

following negative points:

(a)

Social/psychological consequences

Average length of stay in the camps is now 17 months; longest

stayers have been there 2 years. There is already considerable

concern that the isolation and confinement are making refugees more

difficult to

to settle elsewhere and prone to violence. There have

been sporadic outbreaks of violence and a 3 day hunger strike. Such

manifestations seem certain to increase and worsen unless prospects

for resettlement improve markedly.

(b)

Public criticism

CONFIDENTIAL