TNAG-1423-FCO40-1906-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 64

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SEEK OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT. THE AIM OF THIS POLICY IS TO DETER WOULD-BE REFUGEES FROM SETTING OUT FROM VIETNAM. THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ENSURE THAT NEWS OF THE POLICY

REACHES THOSE STILL IN VIETNAM. THE CENTRES ARE RUN BY SPECIALLY RECRUITED STAFF OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, WHICH IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR RUNNING HONG KONG'S PRISONS AND OTHER

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THE UNHCR REIMBURSES THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD OF ITS ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON REFUGEES (HKDLRS 20 MILLION OUT OF A TOTAL OF HKDLRS 60 MILLION IN

1984).

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CLOSED CENTRE POLICY

7. EFFECT ON ARRIVALS

THE POLICY HAS BEEN PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN ITS AIMS IN THAT IT APPEARS TO HAVE HELPED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF REFUGEE ARRIVALS: 1983 ARRIVALS WERE 53 PERCENT DOWN ON 1982, 1984 WERE 39 PERCENT DOWN ON 1983, (COMPARED WITH REDUCTIONS OF 36 PERCENT IN 1983, AND 17 PERCENT IN 1984 IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN REGION AS A WHOLE). AGAINST THIS SUCCESS MUST BE OFFSET THE FOLLOWING

NEGATIVE POINTS:

(A) SOCIAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY IN THE CLOSED CENTRES IS NOW 17 MONTHS:

LONGEST STAYERS HAVE BEEN THERE 2 AND A HALF YEARS. THERE IS GROWING

CONCERN THAT THE CONFINEMENT IS MAKING REFUGEES MORE DIFFICULT TO

SETTLE ELSEWHERE AND PRONE TO VIOLENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN SPORADIC

OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE AND A 3 DAY HUNGER STRIKE. SUCH MANIFESTATIONS SEEM CERTAIN TO INCREASE AND WORSEN UNLESS

PROSPECTS FOR RESETTLEMENT IMPROVE MARKEDLY.

(B) PUBLIC CRITICISM

ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A PERHAPS SURPRISING LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS UNDOUBTEDLY A DISTASTEFUL POLICY, IT HAS BEEN CRITICISED BY SOME BRITISH MPS AND JOURNALISTS VISITING HONG KONG. THE BRITISH REFUGEE COUNCIL, THE MAIN UK BODY CONCERNED WITH REFUGEE QUESTIONS HAVE EXAMINED THE POLICY AND HAVE MADE SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW THE CENTRES MIGHT BE IMPROVED. SOME OF THESE HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED. THE BRC, WHILE REMAINING CRITICAL, APPEAR TO REGARD THE CENTRES AS A NECESSARY EVIL, AND RECOGNISE

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CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COPY THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN

CLOSED UNDER

FOI EXEMPTION NO.: 4027(1)