TNAG-1423-FCO40-1906-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-general-1985 — Page 129

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

CONFIDENTIAL

UNHCR officials to the Hong Kong Government official who attended

the Executive committee meeting of UNHCR in October 1984.

V PROGNOSIS

11.

In 1984 Hong Kong's refugee arrivals and departures decreased

by 39% and 12% respectively from the 1983 levels. If these rates

were to continue over the next few years, Hong Kong's refugee

population would fall to around 6000 by the end of 1988, and dwindle

to virtually nothing by 1993. (Table 1). But the Hong Kong

Government do not consider this to be a realistic basis for

calculation. The 39% reduction in the arrival rate in 1984 was less

than the 53% reduction in 1983. Hong Kong believes that they are

now receiving a hard core of determined Vietnamese emigrants who

have no faith in the Orderly Departure Programme and who regard the

closed centres as no discouragement. They therefore think it more

likely that the rate of decrease in arrivals will be in keeping with

the regional decrease (which is itself slowing down; it was 17% in

1984). On this basis, Hong Kong's refugee population could be

expected to decline to around 8,700 by the end of 1988, provided

that resettlement levels did not decrease any faster than in 1984

(table 2). However if resettlement levels were to fall off more

sharply than this, as Hong Kong expect them to, there would be a

slight increase in the refugee population, to just over 13,000 by

1988 (table 4).

12. Hong Kong has shown that it can provide for refugees on a long

term basis, in cooperation with UNHCR and the voluntary agencies.

But the prospect of 8,000 to 13,000 still in Hong Kong in 1988, and

for who knows how long thereafter is profoundly worrying for the

following reasons:

(a) As the length of stay in camps, particularly closed camps,

increases and the prospects for resettlement for most refugees

remain poor or worsen, despair may set in and give rise to

disturbances of which we have already had a foretaste (para 6(a)

above). Hunger strikes may give way to riots.

face

will

strong humanitarion

outbreaks of violence.

(b) The Hong Kong Government and HMG

lobbying, especially if there are

CONFIDENTIAL

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