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(CONT)
Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Caveat
Precedence
TELELETTER
2 Cambodia, and in the diplomatic arena? Assessment of prospects
3
for resistance? (Son Sann, Head of KPNCF to call on Secretary
4 of State, 8 November).
5 iv)
6
Vietnamese wedge-driving will no doubt continue.
serious to you believe differences are within ASEAN (eg
7 between Indonesia and Thailand) over Cambodia?
8
10
11
How
v) Understand you have provided food aid inside Cambodia
9 during past year. We have not. What is your current
assessment of food situation there? What assurances do you
receive that your aid reaches Cambodian not Vietnamese mouths?
Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong
12
13 vi)
14
15
We have already approached you about this (FCO telno 432
of 23 September). We shall keep in close touch with Mr
Murata (Tokyo telno 684 of 27 September).
16 you will be able to assist.
17 3. Philippines.
19
20
Very much hope
18 i) We remain very pessimistic about the prospects, political
and economic. Communists making rapid strides, in urban and
rural areas. New People's Army now 15-20,000. On present
trends, could lead to downfall of Government within 5 years, 22 with major implications for ASEAN: SE Asia: West. But
Japanese take less gloomy view. On what grounds? What is
24 their latest prognosis?
21
23
25 ii) Do Japanese see any signs that Filipinos, eg in Catholic
26 Church, becoming more aware of realities of Communist threat?
27 iii) Views on succession. Prospects for middle of road
28
compromise candidate? Who do the Japanese want, post Marcos?
Assessment of current US-Philippines relations? (Problems 30 over Bases: visit in October by Reagan's emissary, Senator
LAXALT).
29 iv)
31
11
32
v) To what extent does Japan feel able to use its economic 33 muscle to promote reform in the Philippines?
34 vi) Assessment of Soviet bloc strategy/activities in
For distribution order see Page
Catchword: Philippines
XY 48A (REV)
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