TNAG-1420-FCO40-1903-Hong-Kong-Parliamentary-Sub-Committee-on-Race-Relations-and--1985 — Page 22

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

5. WILSON EXPLAINED HMG'S RECENT DECISION ON VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG. WOLFOWITZ SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOR REFUGEE ADMISSIONS IN FY1986 HAD NOT BEEN WELL RECEIVED IN CONCRESS. THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE HAD CUT DLRS45 MILLION FROM THE OVERALL PROGRAMME AND CUTS OF A FEW THOUSAND IN THE CEILING FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES WERE LIKELY. HE RECOGNISED THE LONG-TERM PROBLEM IN HONG KONG, BUT THERE WERE SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA. BUT THE DEPUTY UNHCR HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THEY HOPED TO BUILD ON HMG'S DECISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD LOOK AT HONG KONG'S PROBLEMS SYMPATHETICALLY. WILSON ALSO RECEIVED A SYMPATHETIC HEARING ON THIS FROM CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ. 6. WOLFOWITZ SAID THE JENKINS BILL ON TEXTILE IMPORTS STILL ENJOYED STRONG SUPPORT IN CONGRESS. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE DETERMINED TO RESIST THIS AND THE PRESIDENT HAD PERSONALLY MADE CLEAR HIS OPPOSITION TO THE BILL. BUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT CONGRESS MIGHT OVERRIDE A PRESIDENTIAL VETO STILL EXISTED. WILSON SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMAL ADVICE ABOUT LORRYING ON HONG KONG'S BEHALF, AND WOLFOWITZ AGREED IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO

KEEP IN TOUCH.

US/CHINA RELATIONS

7. WOLFOWITZ SAID THE AMERICANS WERE EXPECTING A FURTHER MESSAGE ON TAIWAN VIA LEE KWAN YEW. BUT THE CHINESE WERE THOROUGHLY MISREADING THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION. THEY SEEMED TO BELIEVE HE COULD DELIVER TAIWAN, AND DO SO IN A WAY WHICH SERVED CHINESE INTERESTS. THEY WERE WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS. THE US DID NOT HAVE THE INFLUENCE, AND IF THE PRESIDENT WERE TO PUT SUCH PRESSURE ON TAIWAN, THE MOST LIKELY RESULT WOULD BE AN INCREASE IN INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT, WHICH WAS WHAT THE CHINESE THEMSELVES MOST FEARED. NOR COULD THE PRESIDENT OVERRULE THE CONSERVATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES WHO PELIEVED THE US STILL HAD COMMITMENTS- TO TAIWAN. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION, AS THE CHINESE SAW IT, OF SEIZING A QUOTE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE. THIS WAS SOMETHING THE CHINESE HAD TO SOLVE THEMSELVES, BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE CHINESE REALIZED THAT THERE COULD RE NO QUICK FIX AND THAT A SOLUTION WOULD ONLY COME THROUGH EVOLUTION. LEE KUAN YEW HAD EARLIER ADVISED THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WOULD BE CRAZY TO BECOME INVOLVED. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN TELLING THE CHINESE FIRMLY IN PRIVATE THAT PUSHING THE PRESIDENT ON THIS ISSUE WOULD NOT GET THEM ANYWHERE, BUT WERE TRYING TO AVOID THIS RECOMING A MATTER OF PUBLIC ISSUE.

B•

WOLFOWITZ COMMENTED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION WERE NOT WORRIED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS, THE IMPROVING TONE OF THOSE RELATIONS WAS NOT HELFING THE CHINESE CAUSE IN CONGRESS: THIS COULD RECOME A SERIOUS FACTOR IF CONTENTIOUS ISSUES WERE TO DEVELOP. WOLFOWITZ SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE GOING AHEAD WITH THE NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF THE SALE OF ARTILLERY SHELLS TO THE PRC. THEY WERE TAKING THIS UNCONTENTIOUS ITEM FIRST IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR MORE DIFFICULT SALES, INCLUDING THE AVIONICS PACKAGE FOR THE FS NEXT YEAR. DISCUSSION ON SALES OF NAVAL EQUIPMENT WERE CONTINUING, THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY SLOWED DOWN

CONFIDENTIAL -2-

IBY

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