TNAG-1417-FCO40-1900-Hong-Kong-Parliamentary-Sub-Committee-on-Race-Relations-and--1985 — Page 13

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

THE HOME AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE ON RACE RELATIONS AND IMMIGRATION 123

4 February 1985]

[Continued

Thailand with considerable success. However there have been very few volunteers from among Vietnamese refugees in camps in Hong Kong. Of the 20 who have so far applied, 14 have returned to Vietnam. The other six applications are still pending.

If at a later date potential volunteers can be provided with adequate guarantees from the Vietnamese Government concerning their treatment on return, this may become a more attractive option. For the time being, though, it is unlikely to appeal to more than a very few.

(b) Integration in the Country of First Asylum

This is another option favoured by UNHCR. Hong Kong has indeed absorbed over 14,000 refugees and displaced persons from Indo-China since 1975. But it cannot realistically be expected to absorb any more: the territory is too small. It is already one of the most overcrowded places in the world. (Its population density is 20 times that of the UK).

18. In view of the considerations in paragraph 17 (a) and (b) above, and in the absence of any indication that the Vietnamese authorities will reaccept those either who wish to go back or whom resettlement countries consider do not qualify as refugees, the Hong Kong Government consider that resettlement in third counftries is the only realistic option for the refugees currently residing in Hong Kong's camps. We support this view.

19. Urgency of the Problem

しん

(i) 18 per cent of the refugees in Hong Kong's camps have been in the territory for over five years. Their predicament seems to them hopeless and they_are_becoming extremely frustrated. In July 1984 most of the 2,410 refugees at the Hei Ling Chau closed centre staged a three day hunger strike in protest at the lack of resettlement opportunities. The Hong Kong authorities later learned that leaders of the protest planned to break out of the camp and seize a boat. Considerable quantities of weapons were found. Although the ringleaders were removed elsewhere, the source of the refugees' frustration remains. The longer they have to live in the camps, the more likely it is that violence will result.

(ii) The local Chinese population of Hong Kong resents the special treatment which is afforded to the Vietnamese. They consider it unjust that Vietnamese are allowed to

remain indefinetely in Hong Kong while illegal immigrants from China, with whom

they have closer ethnic and social ties, are repatriated. They find it difficult to accept that public money should be spent on building, equipping and running refugee camps rather than on social welfare and other amenities for the local population. (The cost to the Hong Kong Government this financial year of providing asylum for Vietnamese refugees will be Hong Kong $90 million, equivalent to £9 million). There is a general feeling that Hong Kong is being asked to shoulder more than its fair share of the Vietnamese refugee burden. This resentment is directed in part at HMG. For these reasons it is highly desirable that the refugees at present in Hong Kong should be resettled as quickly as possible.

20. Arguments for the admission of Vietnamese Refugees from Hong Kong into the UK (ie as opposed to other countries of resettlement).

It might be argued that the UK should accept for resettlement all those refugees in camps in Hong Kong who have not been accepted for resettlement there. But this would be totally unrealistic, given the many conflicting pressures on HMG to accept refugees from other areas of the world and the difficulties we have experienced in resettling those we have already accepted. There are stronger arguments for the UK to accept a reasonable proportion of those at present in Hong Kong, although these too must be balanced against the difficulties of resettlement in the UK (see part IA above):

(i) Because of HMG's responsibility for Hong Kong as a dependent territory (see para 15 above), the Hong Kong Government and the people of Hong Kong understandably look to HMG for support in solving such a difficult problem.

Comments

Approved members can add comments, bookmarks, and private notes.

No comments yet.

Private Research Note

Private notes are available after approval.