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The experience was sobering for the Chinese too. They accused the Hong Kong Government of trying to "play the economic card" to bring pressure on them. But it brought home to them the vital importance of maintaining the level of confidence in Hong Kong if their determination to recover Hong Kong was not to result in the acquisition of an economically devastated city. The Chinese would have been prepared to accept the risk of a disastrous collapse of confidence rather than contemplate continuing British administration. But the events of the summer and autumn of 1983 brought home to them that the objective of preserving Hong Kong as a useful entity to China would be unachievable without a freely negotiated agreement with the British.
20. The Chinese accepted the new formula, the atmosphere improved and Hong Kong breathed again. The magic words "useful and constructive" reappeared in the communiqué. We were then faced with the problem of telling the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council, who were not at that stage aware of the new formula, that the game plan had changed. At a meeting on 16 December 1983, I informed them in confidence that the Chinese were extremely firm that the continuation of British administration in any form beyond 1997 was not acceptable. The severity of the blow was obvious and the atmosphere emotional. I nevertheless assured Members that this was not the end of the road. There was still much to play for and I gave them my assurance that the UK negotiating team would continue to do their utmost to get the best possible deal for Hong Kong.
21. Meanwhile, in Hong Kong itself the community was demonstrating its determination not to be left out of decisions on its own future. There was constant criticism of the confidentiality of the negotiations, a confidentiality which had to be preserved if the negotiations were not to degenerate into a battle of conflicting public statements. For their part the Chinese tried to treat the negotiations as a purely bilateral matter between Britain and China in which Hong Kong should have no voice. There could, as the Chinese put it, be no "three-legged stool". They took great offence to a motion introduced in the Hong Kong Legislative Council on 24 February 1984 by Mr Roger (now Sir Roger) Lobo, the Senior Unofficial Member of the Council, which called for a debate on any proposals for a Sino-British settlement before that settlement was accepted. This was carried unanimously on 14 March amid rublings backstage from Peking.
22.
By this time, the timetable imposed by the Chinese for the completion of the negotiations, September 1984, was beginning to loom. Although never formally accepted by HMG the Chinese maintained that it was immovable. Since it was evident that the best arrangement achievable would not include the continuation of British administration there was a pressing need to prepare the Hong Kong community as a whole for such an outcome. The first step was taken by you, sir, at a Good Friday press conference in Hong Kong on 20 April 1984 when you announced publicly that British administration could not continue after 1997. Fortunately, you were by that time able to forecast that there would nevertheless be a formal agreement which would give Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy and provide for the continuation of the essential elements of its society. As the message sunk in, Hong Kong went into a state of gloom but with its usual resilience, and buoyed by increasingly healthy economy, it quickly took the announcement in its stride.
23.
Once we were committed to the severance of the link with Britain in 1997, the people of Hong Kong had to be convinced that the prospect of substantial autonomy, of the preservation of their way of life, and of "Hong Kong people running Hong Kong" was a real one. They were already casting off the refugee mentality of the immediate post-war generation, who had been grateful to find decent administration in Hong Kong, and did not trouble themselves greatly with participating in it. In the summer of 1984, in order to keep abreast of a growing demand for greater participation in government, the Hong Kong Government published a Green Paper on the further development of representative government, providing for some members of the Legislative Council to be elected indirectly by geographical and functional constituencies; and subsequently produced revised proposals in a White Paper instituting such elections in 1985. The Chinese were wise enough not to denounce these proposals.
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