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relationships between market economies. The presumption is that the GATT rules ensure fair competition and that, even when the competition is fierce and painful, open trade will be maintained, to the benefit of members. The burden of proof lies on the party who believes himself the victim of "unfair" competition: he must find evidence of subsidy or dumping. In the case of China, this would not do. The onus of proof must be so reversed. Since other GATT members would not be receiving commitments from China which were to any value, they must be free to release themselves from
their own GATT commitments to China whenever these became an embarr-
assment. What provisions in a Protocol of Accession would have this effect? The following are possibilities:-
(a) Tariffs:
It would in theory be possible to exclude China from the benefits of MFN bindings. This would permit unilateral, uncompensated action to raise the level of duties if the EC were faced with a surge of imports from China while EC exporters remained limited in their ability to compete in the Chinese market. But China has MFN status already under the EC-China Agreement, and it
is probably not realistic to seek GATT terms less favour- able than present rules. However the EC could apply Article XXXV to secure this exception if China acceded on
otherwise unsatisfactory terms.
(b) Quantitative Restrictions:
Under the present State Trading protocols of accession to GATT, the UK may not impose new QRS on say, Poland, and may not increase the level of discrimination represented by existing QRs. In practice the latter provision has been loosely applied. The UK could seek a provision in China's protocol which permitted additional QRs, if necessary without prior consultation. This would amount to a special safeguard clause, uncompensated, selective and without test
of injury.
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