TNAG-1378-FCO40-1826-Future-of-Hong-Kong-legislation-Hong-Kong-Bill-1985 — Page 27

(c) SOVEREIGNTY

CONFIDENTIAL

[IF IT IS SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD LEAVE THE TERMINATION

OF SOVEREIGNTY TO A LATER ORDER RATHER THAN DEALING WITH

IT IN THE BILL]

(and

It would theoretically be possible to include a provision

in the Bill enabling a later Order in Council to terminate

sovereignty. If, however, this Order were to be subject

to either negative or positive resolution procedures, I can understand that the House might feel reluctant to

authorise any other procedure in an Order in Council of this nature) the Government would not be able to ratify

the agreement. To do so would anticipate the views of the House on these matters and commit them by legally binding international agreement to one particular view.

I

The substitution of such a procedure would give rise to considerable suspicion of our intentions. Nor do I

believe that it would give us any effective deterrent.

have difficulty in imagining such drastic circumstances

that we would want, when faced with the imminent expiry of

the lease over the New Territories, to repudiate the

agreement. If such circumstances were to arise it would

always be open to Parliament to repeal this Act before the

transfer of sovereignty took place. This would have precisely the same effect as failing to make an Order in

Council. In short, the Order in Council procedure would achieve nothing useful, and could give rise to great difficulties now.

CONFIDENTIAL

C