TNAG-1357-FCO40-1798-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1985 — Page 46

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(GB)

18. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE SAP AND

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WE MUST AWAIT CHINESE VIHEWS. BEGIN SQUARE

BRACKETS WE WOULD HAVE NO CAUSE TO OBJECT IF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

(WHO MUST BE A LOCAL HONG KONG CHINESE) WAS BOTH CHIEF EXECUTIVE

AND HAD A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING. END SQUARE BRACKETS.

IF IT WERE INTENDED TO HAVE IN ADDITION A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG WE WOULD NEED TO KNOW WHAT POWERS AND

JURISDICTION HT WAS PROPOSED TO GIVE HIM BEFORE COMING TO ANY

CONCLUSIONS ON THE MATTER.

19. BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS ON THE METHOD OF CHOOSING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE THERE IS LIKELY TO BE MORE SUPPORT IN HONG KONG FOR A SYSTEM OF CONSULTATION AMONG A DEFINED GROUP OF REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

MN THE LEGISLATURE, THAN FOR A CONTESTED ELECTION ON THE LINES OF PRESIDENT PAL ELECTIONS ELSEWHERE. END SQUARE BRACKETS.

20. ON THE METHOD OF CHOOSING REPRESENTATIVES THERE IS AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS IN THE JOINT DECLARATION

THAT 'THE LEGISLATURE OF THE HONG KONG SAR SHOULD BE CONSTITUTED

BY ELECTIONS''.

Redacted under FOI Exemptions Sec 27(1)