TNAG-1357-FCO40-1798-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1985 — Page 142

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Without democracy, it was argued, top civil servants had the freedom to respond quickly to situations where urgent government action was needed; businessmen and the industrious public could get on with doing what they were best at, working hard, making money and pocketing most of it, and Hong Kong's export orientated economy was not lumbered by an inflexible cost-price structure supported by politically organized labour.

The British Disease

In horrible contrast to undemocratic but prosperous and dynamic Hong Kong democratic Britain (often cartooned as a lazy toothless and moulting lion) was seen by Hong Kong people as an object lesson; a once great country that had ruined its economy and the work ethic of its people by democratic politics.

The anti-democratic attitudes I have described were deeply entrenched in the thinking of all but a tiny minority of Hong Kong people for at least three decades prior to 1980. I do not believe that the Government's propaganda campaign has altered, in any significant way, this fundamental conviction that democratic politics is the potential enemy of Hong Kong prosperity and stability.

Furthermore, Hong Kong's prosperity and stability have now taken on a new political significance. It is argued, and with good reason, that if Hong Kong fails to meet China's expectations as a catalyst to China's modernisation, which it can only do by remaining competitive, innovative and stable, nothing will save it from extinction.

Why Democracy Now?

So you have to ask yourself, if Hong Kong's prosperity and stability have now become so vital to its very survival, why has the Government suddenly gone all out to introduce and involve the whole community in the very system of democratic politics it always believed would bring about Hong Kong's economic ruin? It is ironic. It is suspicious. But I do not think the reasons are that hard to figure out.

Presentational Problems

When in the autumn of 1983 Britain capitulated to China's demands for a complete British withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997, both governments were faced with serious presentational problems. China's problem was that if its recovery of Hong Kong was to serve as an acceptable model for Taiwan it had to convince Taiwan and Hong Kong people that a British withdrawal from Hong Kong did not mean a Peking takeover. The agreed solution was to say that when the British pulled out, Hong Kong people would govern the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Peking would promise that it would not interfere in Hong Kong's internal affairs after 1997. A vague formula for a seemingly democratic form of self-government for Hong Kong was therefore written into Annex I of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. But Peking's categorical promises of non-interference in Hong Kong affairs after 1997 were modified to an assurance of "a high degree of autonomy."