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and in my view if such a power is not introduced at the outset
when Hong Kong takes the first step towards an elected legislature, it will in practice be very difficult to do so later without appearing to impose new curbs on the legislature.
Specific acts to vary the timing of elections seem to me a
more dangerous and open-ended precedent than the use of powers
of dissolution.
11. Nor is it clear that it would be undesirable for a future
Chief Executive of the SAR to have such a power, provided that it was firmly coupled to a requirement to hold fresh elections within a specified and short period (as we envisage would be
the case if the power is written into the new constitutional
instruments). There is nothing abhorrent about such a power,
which exists in many countries including the UK. Without it
there would be no constitutional way of breaking a deadlock
between the Chief Executive and the Legislature: a Chief
Executive in this position would be tempted to seek to bypass
the legislature in other less acceptable ways. While we
cannot make constitutional provision to preclude disputes
between the Executive and the Legislature, a Chief Executive
reliant upon his Legislature to enact annual money bills, as
he should be under the agreement, would gain nothing by seeking
to frustrate the Legislature through repeated dissolutions: and
if he did seek to do so, a more powerful legislature could be
elected. Democracy within the SAR would thus stand to be
strengthened rather than weakened.
12. I am therefore inclined to press the Governor to agree
that a power of dissolution should be incorporated in the
current amendments to the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions,
(and reflected in the Hong Kong Electoral Bill).
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.../Timing
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