TNAG-1353-FCO40-1794-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1985 — Page 127

CONFIDENTIAL

7.

(b) It would give the Chinese good arguments for

giving the same power to the Chief Executive in the

SAR after 1997, thus detracting from the authority

of the legislature. It would not chime well with

the clause in the agreement providing that "the

legislative power of the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region shall be vested in the

legislature "of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region".

(c) It would not be practical politics for the Governor

to exercise such powers in the circumstances of

Hong Kong.

(d) It is unnecessary in that sufficient powers exist

under the Letters Patent to cope with any crisis

situations; in the last resort it would also be

possible to amend the Letters Patent in a crisis

to provide whatever powers were necessary.

These are powerful arguments. On balance I consider,

though some risk is involved, that it would be right to accept the Governor's view and not to introduce reserve powers,

relying instead on HMG's power of legislate direct from London

in an emergency, or even to make constitutional amendments

specifically to cope with such an emergency.

8.

Power of Dissolution of the Legislature

The Governor's present proposals provide for an election of members every three years with no power to dissolve the

legislature and hold new elections in between. This has two

main disadvantages:

(a) It would remove the option of seeking to break any

deadlock between executive and legislature by a

dissolution followed by elections.

CONFIDENTIAL

.../(b)