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15,300. Besides, its detail is generally good detail, stipulating no change or little change and pro ng Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy in all spheres except (probably) the executive. The only real disappointments are on nationality, where the Chinese refused to agree to transmissibility after 30 June, 1997, of British nationality to the first generation of descendents of those who had been British Dependent Territory Citizens; on defence, where Deng Xiaoping had publicly committed China to sending troops to Hong Kong after 1997; and on government structures, where some of the provisions are vaguer than we would have wished. Big plus points are that the agreement is legally binding and that all of it will be stipulated in a Basic Law for the Hong Kong SAR which the Chinese will draw up between now and 1990. The regime provided for in the agreement is less than the ideal of continued British administration. But it has been judged. acceptable by the Executive and Legislative Councils in Hong Kong and, on all the evidence so far, is likely to be judged acceptable by Parliament.
25.
Could we have got a better agreement? Some have expressed the view that, if we had made a pre-emptive concession of sovereignty in 1979 before Chinese ideas were formed, we might have been able to retain British administration. Whether or not that view is correct, the option was never open politically. As Sir Percy Cradock pointed out in his despatch of 12 December, 1983, such a concession would have meant abandoning without having tried them a whole series of what seemed at the time defensible positions.
The Future
26. I am often asked whether China can be trusted to honour the agreement. To answer the question entails taking two views: about China's interests and about the character of the successors to China's present leaders. I believe that China's interests will militate in favour of the honouring of the agreement. What are these interests? They are cognate with the reasons why the Chinese leaders decided to negotiate with us (paragraph 15 above). It is a Chinese interest to warp Taiwan alongside as smoothly and rapidly as possible. If things were to go badly wrong in Hong Kong, either before or after 1997, the prospect of China's doing this would be seriously damaged. It is a Chinese interest for Hong Kong to continue to prosper, not only because China earns upwards of a quarter of its foreign exchange from Hong Kong, but also because she needs the skills and experience of Hong Kong for her development. If things were to go wrong in Hong Kong, China's ambitious development programme would be set back. It is a Chinese interest for China to be regarded as a responsible and reliable member of the international community. If things were to go wrong in Hong Kong, especially after 1997, China's reputation in the world would suffer. These interests are neither ephemeral nor negligible. As to the character of the successors, all that can be said for certain is that Deng Xiaoping is doing his utmost to place people of his way of thinking in positions of power. He may not succeed in placing them everywhere. And those he has placed could quarrel among themselves after his departure. But my reading of the broader picture is that the Cultural Revolution was the product of a concatenation of circumstances which is most unlikely to recur and that China is settling down to a phase of post-revolutionary rationality.
27. On the assumption that China honours the agreement, what is the outlook for the 13 years between now and 1997? For Hong Kong these will not be easy years. The transitional period is much longer than the period we have agreed to for any other dependent territory. Set against that, the Chinese need our cooperation. We should give it. Having circumscribed the powers of the Joint Liaison Group, we should now use it to ensure the smooth implementation of the agreement and to give the future SAR as fair a wind as possible. An obvious subject on which tactful advice could be offered in the group is the drafting of the Basic Law. The Chinese will draft the Basic Law. But we should take every opportunity to feed in our views and, in so doing, to reflect the views of the people of Hong Kong.
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