୮
(ii)
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Parliamentary scrutiny.
But
we could point to our
own
practice in Peking and other communist capitals.
Chinese to
it would be more likely than Option A to lead the press for reciprocal treatment in Hong Kong. We could not grant exact reciprocity there, in the absence of a Chinese diplomatic mission. It might instead be necessary to cover this point in the local legislation granting immunities and
privileges to the full members of the group. After 1988, we might expect the Chinese to press for some more explicit provisions covering the immunities of supporting staff resident in Hong Kong. They might well age that it wild be anomalous if resident supporting staff did not reserve the same degree of immunity as the supporting staff of the
Chinese Visa Office.
OPTION C
11. We could extend the Clause in the Bill to make explicit provision for all those associated with the Joint Liaison Group and its sub groups and ask for similar action by the Chinese authorities in Peking. This has no significant advantages compared with Option
The disadvantages are that:
B•
(i)
(ii)
the passage of legislation through Parliament might be greatly complicated, given the distaste with which Parliament views any extension of diplomatic privileges and immunities. It would be particularly difficult to explain that the provisions were being extended (as in practice they would have to be) not only to the 20 members of the Chinese supporting staff but an unspecified number of experts who might take part in the work of the group and any sub groups.
to
we should be open to the criticism, in Parliament and elsewhere, that in this respect we were going beyond the
terms of the agreement, without any very good reason. We should have to explain why the original agreement was deficient. It might strengthen our defence if we had already negotiated with the Chinese an understanding that the terms
of the agreement should be taken to embrace those other than
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