TNAG-1330-FCO40-1757-Future-of-Hong-Kong-test-of-the-acceptability-of-the-Joint-D-1984 — Page 325

Sir Percy Cradock

Cradget

CONFIDENTIAL

76A

HKK 040/46

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

2 5OCT 1984

DESK OFFICER

INDEX

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PA

Action ken

Sir Patrick Nairne

JAK

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Sir Patrick Nairne called on the Secretary of State this morning.

The Secretary of State said that he was very pleased that Sir Patrick Nairne had agreed to be a monitor. The British Government attached great importance to the assessment exercise. Parliament would wish to be assured that the views of the people of Hong Kong had been accurately reported.

The Secretary of State explained the background to the negotiations, which had begun two years ago. In April the Secretary of State had visited Peking and on his arrival in Hong Kong had outlined the kind of agreement which we had in mind. After his most recent visit to Peking in July, he had given the Hong Kong people a more detailed and firm indication of the way the negotiations had gone. There had also been debates in the House of Commons. Hence both the Hong Kong people and Parliament already had a fairly clear indication of our intentions and the progress so far made. Our aim, if a suitable agreement was obtained, would be to initial in September, sign in December and ratify by the end of June next year. We had been working under a time constraint which was an important element in the pattern of the negotiations.

The Secretary of State went on to say that when the Hong Kong people came to assess the acceptability of the agreement, an important factor would be to ensure that they were fully aware of the only real alternative, namely no agreement and a unilateral statement by the Chinese Government of its intentions. The British Government had never considered that a bad agreement was better than no agreement. But they had never been in any doubt about the importance of securing an acceptable agreement. The Secretary of State said that there had been some discussion earlier about the possibility of using a Referendum for testing the acceptability of the agreement to the Hong Kong people. However, it was clear that a Referendum would not be acceptable to the Chinese Government. It would also be a significant departure from accepted Hong Kong practice. In the event, there was no real support in the House of Commons for the idea of a Referendum, and probably only limited support in Hong Kong.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL