TNAG-1317-FCO40-1720-Future-of-Hong-Kong-meetings-of-the-Cabinet-Defence-and-Over-1984 — Page 137

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7. On the other hand, pessimism about the future prospects for Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty and anger at HMG's acceptance of this concept may lead the Unofficials and

the Hong Kong people more generally to an increasing disillusionment with HMG and Britain as a whole, with unfortunate effects on the authority of the Hong Kong Government and possibly on the governability of the territory. It is greatly to be hoped that the first of these scenarios will develop, but it would require a volte-face by Unofficials that they have hitherto shown few signs of being willing to make. There must remain a danger (referred to in the Commons by Hal Miller) that some of the Unofficials will resign. This would probably have a more damaging effect now than would have been the case before the visit, given the degree of public support they have attracted.

8. The next few weeks are therefore likely to be extremely delicate ones in HMG's relationship with the Unofficials, and indeed with the people of Hong Kong generally. It will be particularly important that a prolonged post-mortem on the debate does not take place and that a more positive mood is somehow engendered. Unless there are any positive developments in the talks, and it is unlikely that any that do occur would be made public at this stage, this will have to be done through other means. A certain amount could perhaps be done through public statements. Statements by HMG would have to be very carefully drafted if they were not to be counter productive. The Governor (perhaps on his return to Hong Kong) would be better placed to call for realism and a positive, constructive approach to the future. Other senior Hong Kong officials, less strongly identified with HMG, could play a helpful role if they wished to do so. This is even more true of the Unofficials.

9. Another possible area of action, where considerable

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