TNAG-1315-FCO40-1708-Future-of-Hong-Kong-preparation-of-the-Joint-Declaration-1984 — Page 22

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within which the negotiations had worked and the absence of any

realistic alternative to what was on offer. The more explicitly we are able to urge acceptance of the draft agreement by Hong Kong, moreover, the more likely it is that the Chinese can be reconciled

to the whole exercise.

CONCLUSIONS

8.

We should seek a mixture of options (d) and (e) on the following basis:

(i) the Secretary of State's statement in Hong Kong in April will

stimulate enormous public debate. This will be spontaneous and HMG and the Hong Kong Government will not need to

encourage it. But opinion must be carefully monitored;

(ii)

(iii)

after any further ministerial statements later in the Summer revealing more details of the agreement the spontaneous process of discussion would continue on a more informed

basis;

finally after the initialling of the agreement we should

encourage debate through existing bodies. This would be conducted on the basis of the published text of the draft agreement, together with a covering explanatory document. The results, added to the monitoring of publlic opinion, would form the basis of advice from the Hong Kong Government.

to enable HMG to assess whether a recommendation to

Parliament was justified.

EXCO AND LEGCO

9.

The special position of these bodies will have to be taken into

account. EXCO will expect to continue to be closely consulted. We shall need their help in recommending an agreement to opinion in Hong Kong, but Unofficials will be increasingly unwilling on their

wn to endorse points negotiated with the Chinese. LEGCO will wish to debate the question, at least after the Secretary of State's statement in April and again when a draft agreement is published.

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