DD 070100Z HONG KONG
GRS 371
SECRET FUTURE EGRET
TOP COPY
H&HK).
11061 - 1
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SECRET
FUTURE EGRET
DESKBY 0701002
FM FCO 062004Z JAN 84
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 34 OF 6 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING
LIK iconell
1984
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM DONALD
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
4
oken
CH9/2
HKK04019 YOUR TELNO 37 AND PEKING TELNO 29 FUTURE EGRET: WORKING PAPERS
ON CENTRAL ISSUES
1. WE FULLY TAKE THE POINT THAT ALL THE WORKING PAPERS ON KEY
ISSUES WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH EXCO. THE MESSAGE IN FCO
TELNO 5 TO PEKING WAS SIMPLY INTENDED TO EXPLAIN WHY WE MAY NOT
BE ABLE TO MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS WE SHOULD LIKE.
2. THERE IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM OVER THE SEQUENCE IN
WHICH PAPERS SHOULD BE PUT TO EXCO AND TO MINISTERS. ON THE ONE
HAND I CAN QUITE SEE YOUR WISH TO ENSURE THAT MINISTERS TAKE
THEIR DECISIONS IN THE LIGHT OF EXCO'S VIEWS. ON THE OTHER HAND
WE COULD RUN INTO TROUBLE IF WE PUT TO EXCO, EVEN FOR
ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, PROPOSALS WHICH HAD NOT RECEIVED
ENDORSEMENT BY THE MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE, PARTICULARLY WHERE
SENSITIVE QUESTIONS OF UK NATIONAL POLICY IN EITHER AREAS WERE
INVOLVED. THERE IS THE RISK THAT IDEAS GENERALLY AGREED WITH
EXCO MIGHT NOT BE FULLY ENDORSED BY HMG..
3.
THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE NATIONALITY PAPER. WE HAVE
NOT SO FAR CONSULTED THE HOME OFFICE BUT WE HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT
OF THE FACT THAT THE HOME SECRETARY WILL EXAMINE THESE QUESTIONS VERY CAREFULLY FROM A NUMBER OF ANGLES. IT FOLLOWS THAT IF WE
ARE TO PUSH HONG KONG'S CASE WITH THE HOME OFFICE WE SHALL NEED FIRST TO CONVINCE OUR OWN MINISTERS AND POSSIBLY THE PRIME
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SECRET FUTURE EGRET
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