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Nicaragua, and had resumed aid to El Salvador.
27. Mr Clark thought the Americans spoke with two voices: one represented by Mr Shultz, who was genuinely seeking a flexible solution, the other which favoured a hard stand. We should note the views of Nicaragua's neighbours. The Mexicans certainly believed that a collapse in Nicaragua would lead to disorder in Mexico. Canada would do what it could, but did not have exaggerated expectations.
28. Mr Clark said the Progressive Conservative Party was committed to joining the OAS, but the more he saw of the question the less enthusiastic he was about it. What was the British view of the degree of flexibility in American policy?
29.
The Secretary of State said the subject was difficult. We supported the Contadora process and we supported American objectives. We understood the Mexican anxiety about instability in Central America. We were particularly impressed by the Costa Rican fears, which seemed less political and more objective than those of the Mexicans. In El Salvador, under Duarte, so far so good. We had renewed a modest aid programme.
30. On Nicaragua we saw the tendency of the regime to intrude in its neighbours' affairs, the extension of Cuban influence, and also its intrinsically illiberal and irreversible nature. The reason we had not sent observers to the Nicaraguan elections was that we disapproved of the undemocratic atmosphere in which the campaign was conducted. There was interdepartmental schizophrenia in Washington about what to do. We should warn the Russians that the United States meant what they said in their warnings. But the situation remained most unsatisfactory. elections had legitimised the Sandinista regime. the Contadora negotiation could succeed it could decrease Soviet and Cuban influence.
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31. Sir William Harding, who had recently visited Washington, confirmed that the Americans were divided and worried. The alternative to negotiations would be an intervention by force. This would be difficult to justify. But even if there was an agreement what confidence could the Americans have that, as Marxists, the Sandinistas would observe it? Mr Motley had assured him that President Reagan fully supported negotiations. The main problem was that any draft which satisfied the Americans would be unsatisfactory to the Nicaraguans. The Americans recognised our
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