TNAG-1309-FCO40-1666-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1984 — Page 30

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we have clear objectives (maximum continuity and minimal interference) and a clear bottom line (set by what Parliament and Hong Kong people will accept)

we have fully considered all other options: our strategy is the one which best takes account of the realities (92%: China's overriding concern with political principles)

we are making the most of the strengths of our position (China's wish to avoid imposing a settlement: need for our cooperation: the Taiwan analogy: China's economic interests).

Supplementaries

4. Some likely supplementaries are at Annex B.

Question for Editors

5. We are working on the assumption that the most convincing case, both here and in Hong Kong, is a good and if possible detailed agreement at the end of the negotiations. Acutely aware of importance of presentation in Parliament and Hong Kong. other advice on presentation in UK?

Lead-in

But any

6. I would propose to introduce the Secretary of State on the following lines:

Much

HMG are still saying very little about the negotiations to correspondents or public opinion. Rightly our overriding concern is to get best possible agreement at end of process. Confidentiality now is an important part of this. Therefore very much a deliberate decision not to respond to Chinese public statements or press reports. But volume of reporting is likely to increase between visit and September. of it will be inaccurate and alarmist. Important for Editors to have an insight into what HMG are trying to achieve. Envisage this as deep background to help them in handling stories in coming weeks and months. If Editors would welcome a steer at any time from now on, I would be happy to put them in touch with a Minister or senior official.

mulden

PJ Goulden

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