2.
(3)
No one
seems to be paying too much attention to the necessity of
having a credible Government in control of Hong Kong between
now and 1997. The worst thing that could happen would be an
agreement which could solve the 1997 problem but, at the same time,
make the present Hong Kong Government into a lame duck.
3.
There is a lack of trust in the present Chinese Government's
ability to speak for the Chinese Government in power in 1997.
4.
We must preserve, by all means, Hong Kong's economic
credibility in the outside world which means inter alia
that we must have our own strong freely convertible currency.
5.
No one has so far made the rest of the world aware of the
feelings and aspirations of the Hong Kong population.
6.
The world, but especially Britain, must make contingency
plans for the handling of at least three and a half
million refugees should an unacceptable Chinese
unilateral solution be imposed.
Because of the secrecy surrounding the talks and the lack of
communication between government and governed, it is difficult
to judge whether our present negotiators are really fully aware
of the above six points and how they are dealing with them. I
think probably the Hong Kong negotiators are very much aware of
points numbers two and four. The London Government is probably
aware of points one and three, and the Chinese Government may
be aware of all these points, but doesn't really care as its
interest is to impose a political solution already worked out
by the Polit bureaux.
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