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now, contacts
between Japan and North Koea included fisheries,
commerce and exchange of persons: this was inevitable between
neighbours.
20. Mr Matsunaga drew Mr Luce's attention to the passage in the joint communiqué issued at the end of President Chun's visit, in which Japan announced its support for the simul-
taneous accession of North and South Korea to the UN on
condition of course that both parties wished for this. Japan
realised that the ROK was in favour of this course, and North
Korea against. But Japan wished to make its position public.
21. Japan had tried to persuade President Chun that the Asian
Games in 1986 and, even more, the Olympics to be held in Seoul
in 1988, were crucial to the ROK's reputation and status on
the international scene. Japan offered her full cooperation
to make both events a success. It was "crucial" whether China,
and to a lesser extent North Korea, came to the Olympics.
The Chinese government was telling the Japanese that they were
considering coming; but it looked as if North Korea would oppose
the Games.
22.
Mr Matsunaga then explained the differences between Japan's and the ROK's policy towards North Korea. North Korea was trying
to break out from its isolation, a process which we should all
encourage if we wanted North Koea to become more realistic and more moderate. But this policy was delicate vis-a-vis the ROK,
who seemed to want the Japanese and others to continue to pursue a policy of rigid containment designed to compel North
Korea to abandon its fundamental objectives.
23. On the question of North Korea's relations with China
and with the Soviet Union, Mr Matsunaga said that there was a
delicate balance. North Korea wanted to be able to play its
Chinese and its Soviet cards as necessary. It needed the
support of both countries. But the present tendency was to get slightly closer to China - without, however, renouncing
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