TNAG-1297-FCO40-1652-Visit-by-Sir-Geoffrey-Howe--Secretary-of-State-for-Foreign-a-1984 — Page 269

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Tokyo

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from Seoul) is in practice feasible at all, but the Samsung electronics plant nearer Seoul would be possible and there are perhaps alternatives which would be more convenient. I should be grateful for guidance on the Secretary of State's preference; thereafter we can consult Mr Spreckley again;

c) similarly I doubt whether there would be time for a

visit to the National Museum, but if the Secretary of State wishes we could try to squeeze it in. Lady Howe can of course visit the Museum.

Tokyo telno 91 sets out the options. Two points arise:

a) the programme for 25 April assumes arrival before lunch, and the draft programme submitted is drawn up on that basis. If the Seoul programme is to be amended so as to include Panmunjom or an industrial visit that morning, then arrival could not be before 1330 at the earliest and perhaps later: this would involve lunch during the flight and an abbreviated briefing session after arrival in Tokyo. The Embassy have said that they recommend against arrival later than 1330 at the outside;

b) of their two plans for 26 April, the Embassy recommend

the first (Plan A), but point out that it involves a very early start with the Ministerial talks beginning at 0830. If this is acceptable to the Secretary of State I recommend that we ask the Embassy to go firm on Plan A as generally much preferable for the reasons given in the telegram.

Departure from the UK

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It is unlikely to be clear before mid-March whether a trip to Peking will be feasible or necessary. (The current position is covered by Mr Clift's submission of 15 February.) If it is, it would require an earlier start (as early as Good Friday, 20 April, or even earlier if two days are not considered sufficient for Peking); it would also result in a later arrival at Seoul and some curtailment of the programme there. If it is decided to include Peking on the trip I shall submit further on the consequences for the Seoul programme. But I believe that a decision on the general shape of the programme in Seoul cannot be delayed until the decision on Peking is taken.

Composition of Party

Precedent suggests that the Secretary of State's party might be as follows:

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/Secretary