TNAG-1292-FCO40-1644-United-Nations-Conventions-signed-by-the-UK-extension-to-Hon-1984 — Page 27

N G Cox Esq FED

FCO

Dear Cox,

CONFIDENTIAL

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British Embassy

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15 March 1984

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RECEIVED

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19 MAR 1984

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MACAU: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

1. The account in Margolis' teleletter of 8 March is echoed by sources here.

2. Almeida e Costa probably retains Presidential ambitions, though his prospects are uncertain. His non party image may be an advantage if the political party candidates do not attract an electorate which is not used to having a party figure as Head of State. There may therefore be appeal in a military figure like the present President Eanes, who is not eligible to run in 1985 for a third tour. To keep alive the possibility of running, Almeida e Costa may well have decided to use events in Macau to show himself as a man of authority. There have been rumours here that any campaign he might run would be financed by Stanley Ho.

3. Several problems on the lines of Margolis' para 2 seem to have been coming to the boil. Almeida e Costa has claimed in interviews here that social tensions were growing amongst Chinese groupings excluded from representation in the Assembly. He had hoped to negotiate with interested parties before the end of the current legislature in October. In the event, however, obstructive tactics by the vested interests led to his request for dissolution.

4.

Almeida e Costa has focussed his accusations of malpractice and empire-building on the President of the Assembly, Carlos Assumpcao. He has claimed that Assumpcao has had powerful allies in two newspapers, one owned by a deputy linked to CDS and the other to PS. Assumpcao is also alleged to have masterminded the procrastination over the governor's legislative proposals on the new statute and electoral law as well as on anti-corruption and administrative reforms.

15.

CONFIDENTIAL