TNAG-1287-FCO40-1638-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1984 — Page 278

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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POWERS AFTER 1997 BUT ALREADY THESE WOULD EITHER BE EXPLICIT IN THE AGREEMENT (DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS) OR IMPLICIT IN THE PROVISION THAT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF HONG KONG WOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRC.

(III) IF THIS USE OF THE JOINT GROUP WAS NOT ENOUGH TO DISCOURAGE DISORDER THERE WOULD BE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN EXERCISING OUR

RESERVE POWERS AT LONG RANGE.

ARGUMENT

11. THERE ARE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS IN GOING FOR EITHER OF THE EXTREMES OF AN APPOINTED BRITISH GOVERNOR ON THE PRESENT BASIS (OPTION A) OR OF AN ELECTED LOCAL GOVERNOR TO TAKE OVER FROM HIM (OPTION B). NEITHER OF THESE SEEMS ADEQUATELY TO SATISFY ALL THE CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 2-4 ABOVE. THE INCENTIVE FOR US TO SET UP A SYSTEM WITH SOME KIND OF ELECTED OFFICE AT THE

TOP, WITH CHINESE ACQUIESENCE, IS VERY GREAT. IN MANY WAYS, THE COMPROMISE OF A BRITISH GOVERNOR AND AN ELECTED CHIEF MINISTER

(OPTION C) IS AN ATTRACTIVE SOLUTION. WE SHOULD STAND A GOOD CHANCE OF GETTING THE CHINESE TO AGREE TO IT AND IT WOULD BE AT

LEAST A HALF-WAY HOUSE TOWARDS A CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE SAR.

AGAINST THIS IS THE STRONG TEMPTATION FOR THE CHINESE TO

REPRODUCE THE SAME PATTERN AFTER 1997. MOREOVER AS WE SHALL PROBABLY BE INVOLVED IN A JOINT GROUP IN ANY CASE, THERE ARE STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR MAKING USE OF IT AND OF DRIVING AS HARD A

BARGAIN AS WE CAN ON BEHALF OF HONG KONG. THE ADVANTAGES OF

OBTAINING CHINESE AGREEMENT TO A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF AUTONOMOUS

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT BEFORE 1997, WITH AN ELECTED GOVERNOR,

MAKE THE FINAL OPTION OUTLINED ABOVE (OPTION D) ALSO SEEM

ATTRACTIVE.

12. THE CHOICE THEREFORE SEEMS TO LIE BETWEEN OPTIONS C AND D.

THE PROPOSAL FOR A CHIEF MINISTER HAS THE ATTRACTION OF

MAINTAINING A FOCUS OF BRITISH AUTHORITY AND MOVING APPRECIABLY TOWARDS AN ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVE, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CHINESE WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE GOVERNORSHIP SHOULD SIMPLY DISAPPEAR AFTER 1997. THE GOVERNOR, HOWEVER, IS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO THIS IDEA BECAUSE OF THE RISK OF THE CHINESE TAKING OVER THE

'GOVERNORSHIP' AFTER 1997. HE ALSO OPPOSES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

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