1.
SECRET
5. THE SECOND QUESTION IS WHETHER THE CHINESE SHOULD BE GIVEN A VETO OVER THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND IF THAT IS UNDESIRABLE HOW THEY CAN BEST BE GOT TO ACQUIESCE IN IT. THE RISKS IN INCURRING SOME DEGREE OF CHINESE DISPLEASURE MUST BE BALANCED AGAINS THE RISK OF HMG BEING LEFT IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO HAND OVER THE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG TO A COMMUNIST APPOINTED ADMINISTRATION IN 1997 WITHOUT ANY ATTEMPT TO GIVE THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG THE CHANCE TO ELECT THEIR OWN LEADER.
6. WE BELIVED THAT ANSWERS CAN BE FOUND TO THE PROBLEM OF HMG'S RESIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT THE COMPLICATION OF INTRODUCING A CHIFE MINISTER (WHICH WE DO NOT IN ANY CASE THINK WOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM). WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT HMG SHOULD NOT LIGHTLY GIVE THE CHINESE A VETO OVER THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT HERE.
7. GIVEN THESE BASIC DIFFERENCES WITH THE ARGUMENT IN YOUR PAPER WE ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON YOUR PAPER WITHIN YOUR PROPOSED TIMETABLE.
8. WE WILL SEND YOU A FIRST REVISION OF THE DRAFT GREEN PAPER ON THURSDAY 21 JUNE BUT IT WILL STILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED BY MY SENIOR OFFICIALS ON FRIDAY 22 JUNE AND WE WILL SEND YOU FINAL
AMENDMENTS THEN.
9. WE WILL ALSO SEND YOU, ON FRIDAY 22 JUNE, OUR OWN THOUGHTS ON THE THOUGHTS ON THE ANSWERS TO THE TWO QUESTIONS RAISED ABOVE,
NAMELY
(A) WHETHER, AND IF SO, HOW HMG COULD EXERCISE ITS RESIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN HONG KONG AFTER THE ELECTION OF A CHIEF
EXECUTIVE: AND
(B) HOW WE SHOULD SEEK TO SECURE CHINESE ACQUIESCENCE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
BEFORE 1997.
YOUDE
LIMITED
HD/HKD
HD/FED
SIR W HARDING
SECRET
SIR P CRADOCK
MR BURROWS LEGAL ADVISER
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.