TNAG-1284-FCO40-1636-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1984 — Page 32

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of elected office at the top, with Chinese acquiesence, is very

great. In many ways, the compromise of a British Governor and an

elected Chief Minister is an attractive solution. We should stand a

good chance of getting the Chinese to agree to it and it would be at

least a half-way house towards a Chief Executive of the SAR.

Against this is the strong temptation for the Chinese to reproduce

the same pattern after 1997. It is also inescapable that the Chinese are determined to establish a joint group in Hong Kong.

They will regard that as one means of using HMG to ensure that Hong

Kong does not go off the rails. Since we shall probably be involved

in such a group in any case, there are strong arguments for making

use of it and of driving as hard a bargain as we can on behalf of Hong Kong. The advantages of obtaining Chinese agreement to a

complete system of autonomous representative government before 1997,

with an elected Governor, suggest that we should aim at the final

course suggested above (Option D).

IMPLICATIONS

In

10. The proposal therefore is for a tacit deal with the Chinese.

return for our undertaking to co-operate with them in the pre-1997

period through the medium of a joint group at least notionally based in Hong Kong, they would acquiesce in a complete structure of local

representative government. Our reserved powers would be maintained in the most unobtrusive way possible and we would hope to induce the

Chinese to exercise similar restraint after 1997.

PROCEDURE

In

11. The question of consultation with the Chinese is difficult. order to underline our continuing responsibility up to 1997, we would prefer to inform, rather than to consult them on constitutional questions. This, however, is probably impracticable

at least where the Governorship is concerned. We should be in an

impossible position if we published proposals which Peking then

attacked publicly. A better course would be to inform them of the

Green Paper proposals (without plans for the Governorship) shortly

before publication, and at the same time to float with them the

notion of an elected Governor. For this course to be fully

effective we should at the same time have our ideas ready on Item 2 and on the location and operation of a joint group, although the timing of any move on that front would have to be very carefully considered in the context of the negotiations as a whole.

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