TNAG-1284-FCO40-1636-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1984 — Page 135

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publication

They

immediately before this, but we would not consult them on it.

have already in our working papers and statements at the talks been informed in general terms of our intention to proceed along these

lines and have not reacted adversely.

POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR

7. The Ambassador in Peking considers that the Chinese are likely

to view the proposal for an elected Governor with displeasure, and

that their minimum reaction may be that they would state publicly tht they will give no guarantee that this method of selection would

continue after 1997, nor that the powers of the Chief Executive

after 1997 would be similar to those of the Governor before 1997.

8.

There are other reasons why we should look carefully at the proposals relating to the Governor. The removal of his formal power to override EXCO (even though not now exercised in practise) and the

fact that he would be locally elected (though formally appointed by

the Queen) would inevitably weaken both his position as the Chief

Executive and HMG's ability to influence events in Hong Kong. The Crown's reserved powers would remain but there would no longer be a

British centre of power in the territory in the present sense.

9. It is arguable therefore, given the allied problem of the

possible Chinese reaction, that the Green Paper should be less specific about his future position and mode of election. It might

for instance merely suggest the option of election or selection of a local Hong Kong person at an appropriate stage. But it is questionable whether this imprecise approach would be sufficient.

The Governor believes that the proposals would be regarded as incomplete without some precision on this important question.

broad balance it is probably right to accept the proposals as a necessary part of our policy of establishing genuine autonomy in Hong Kong

before 1997.

On

Hong Kong Department

8 June 1984

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