TNAG-1284-FCO40-1636-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1984 — Page 101

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5. The disadvantages of the first course are those pointed out by

Dr Wilson in his minute of 8 June. HMG may be left in the position of having responsibility for the administration of Hong Kong without the power to enforce their will. In such a situation there may be a greater risk of social disorder in the difficult years leading up to

1997. The Chinese are likely to see the proposals as an attempt to throw off our responsibilities and to create a quasi-independent

Hong Kong under a Lee Kwan-Yew type figure.

6.

On the other hand the second course would leave a large hole in

the proposals for democratic development and the concept of local

autonomy which would cause comment in Hong Kong One way of

filling this would be to create a post akin to a Chief Minister,

subordinate to the Governor. With the agreement of the Chinese, it

might even be possible for this Chief Minister to take over as Chief

Executive in 1997. However this formula would openly retain an

external focus of executive power until 1997 that could logically be replaced by a similar Chinese official. But we must expect the Chinese in any case to send a central government representative to

Hong Kong after 1997. In practice if not in theory he would exert

considerable influence.

7.

There is another very serious drawback to the proposition that we should maintain a British-appointed Governor until 1997. He (and

through him HMG) could well find himself taking action (including

the use of British forces) to put down opposition to the return of

Hong Kong to China. While the fact of his presence (and that of British troops) might succeed in inhibiting disturbances it would nevertheless be clear enough that HMG was carrying out the job of

delivering Hong Kong in good order to the PRC.

8. Like it or not, we cannot credibly set up a system for local

election of a Governor without Chinese acquiescence. That is not

guaranteed. The problem is clearly linked with their strong views

on the transition (Item 2). We have to decide how far we are

prepared to accept that there will be Chinese involvement in Hong

Kong before 1997, or rather, how far that involvement can be

acknowledged now without critical damage to confidence. It is not out of the question that they might accept a local Governor provided that tacitly we stood guarantor (in a joint group or otherwise) of Hong Kong's good behaviour. That picture is politically unpalatable too, but it might be workable, provided that publicly the Chinese

/went

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