TNAG-1279-FCO40-1630-Repatriation-of-Vietnamese-refugees-from-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 41

CONFIDENTIAL

sl 1 not make any decision on forcible repatriation

until we know more about Vietnamese thinking.

2.

UNHCR clearly have an interest since all

boat people arriving in the region are currently regarded as their proper charge, and they are of

course still responsible for resettling existing

refugees in Hong Kong. UKMIS Geneva should

therefore draw UNHCR's attention to the fact that

circumstances in Hong Kong, and the main resettlement

countries' new determination to reject a high proportion of boat people (between 40% and 80%)

as failing to qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention, oblige us to explore with the

Vietnamese the possibility (however slim) of

arranging some form of repatriation.

If these

discussions produced satisfactory guarantees,

this would allow Hong Kong to announce more

restrictive handling of boat arrivals and help

to deter subsequent outflows.

3. We will not publicise our approach in Hanoi

and will ask UNHCR to keep our confidence but

must allow for the possibility that any news of

our approach is likely to prompt criticism either

of our considering boat people as no longer

automatically qualifying for refugee status, or

of our seeming prepared to treat in this way

with a Government such as that in Hanoi. We

would propose taking the following line:

(i) we were talking to the Vietnamese about a

range of problems concerning refugees;

(ii) we were making no commitments at this stage.

We wished to remain flexible in order to

CONFIDENTIAL

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